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SET THE CONTROLS FOR THE HEART OF THE MOON: 
IS EXISTING LAW SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE RESOURCE 
EXTRACTION ON THE MOON?1* 
 
Mark J. Sundahl** & Jeffrey A. Murphy*** 
 
The extraction of natural resources from celestial bodies is an indispensa-
ble component of current plans to establish a permanent human presence on 
the Moon, Mars, and, eventually, other planets and moons in our solar system. 
These plans to settle the solar system begin with the international effort to 
construct a Lunar Gateway which is moving forward alongside NASA’s Ar-
temis program (which also involves international partners). This presence on 
the Moon promises to gradually expand as other space agencies, together with 
private industry, join the effort to create what is often referred to as a “Moon 
Village.”1  
Why is resource extraction an inescapable future reality? The simple an-
swer is that the alternative (i.e., bringing all resources from Earth) would be 
prohibitively expensive in light of the aggressive missions being planned by 
NASA and others. Without going into the economic details of launching mass 
into outer space (which are amply explained with a simple Google search), 
suffice it to say that delivering oxygen, water, fuel, and construction materials 
to the Moon from Earth would far more expensive than developing the capa-
bility to harvest such resources from the Moon—particularly if we are talking 
about a Moon village with a significant population. 
 
* The title of this article is inspired by the song “Set the Controls for the Heart of the 
Sun,” written by Roger Waters (Pink Floyd, A Saucerful of Secrets, 1968). 
    **  Professor of Law and Director of the Global Space Law Center at Cleveland State  
 ***  Jeffrey A. Murphy is a 3LE at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. He wishes to offer 
his sincere thanks to his infinitely patient wife, Autumn, and his two children, Oliver and 
Corinne, for enduring this adventure with him. He extends his thanks and appreciation, as 
well, to Prof. Sundahl for the opportunity and pleasure of working with him on this Article 
and for his continued guidance. 
 1 The Moon Village Association has already created an extensive network of profes-
sionals dedicated to resolving the legal and technical issues that will face the early settlers 
of the Moon. See MOON VILL. ASS’N, www.moonvillageassociation.org (last visited Apr. 
17, 2020). 
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Once this premise is accepted, the next questions are legal/regulatory in 
nature. First comes the question of whether resource extraction is permissible 
under international law. Some have argued that Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty prohibits mining operations as a logical corollary of the article’s ban 
on the national appropriation of celestial bodies: “Outer space, including the 
Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by 
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”2 
The purpose of this article of the Outer Space Treaty was to prevent the 
repetition of the Age of Discovery where European countries raced to plant 
their flags and claim all lands beyond the borders of Europe. Article II pro-
hibits the United States from claiming the Moon as its fifty-first state (alt-
hough the Apollo astronauts did plant flags to mark their arrival).3 However, 
arguments to expand the meaning of this article so that it prohibits mining 
have fallen flat. To drive this point home, changes to domestic law in the 
United States, Luxembourg, and, most recently, Japan have codified the le-
gality of space mining—and have done so with diminishing objections from 
the international community.4 
This Article argues that despite the existence of some open questions re-
garding fine points in the law and the unlikelihood of a new treaty regulating 
lunar activity, investors (of whatever type, whether public or private) should 
not be deterred due to any concern about the state of the law. The current 
regulatory process to launch a vehicle and operate a payload may be “clunky” 
in places, but it is not unduly burdensome. While there is plenty of debate 
about regulatory reform, it is a debate about how to improve the existing sys-
tem—not necessarily to fix it. In other words, existing international law is 
already sufficient to protect the interests of investors, nations, and humankind. 
This Article will first look at what resources are likely to be extracted and 
why. We then describe the current international initiatives to forge new law 
regarding resource extraction in outer space. We close by making the case that 
 
 2 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 2, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 
2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
 3 Id. 
 4 For the U.S. law, see Space Resource Commercial Exploration and Utilization, 
51 U.S.C. Ch. 513 (2015). For Luxembourg’s law, see Law on the Exploration and 
Utilization of Space Resources (Loi du 20 juillet 2017 sur l’exploration et l’utilisation des 
ressources de l’espace); of 20 July 2017, published July 28, 2017, available in both 
French and English at https://space-agency.public.lu/en/agency/legal-framework.ht 
ml. For the Japanese law, see Regulation for Enforcement of the Act on Launching 
of Spacecraft, Etc. and Control of Spacecraft (Cabinet Office Order No. 50 of 2017), 
https://www8.cao.go.jp/space/english/activity/documents/space_activity_act.pdf. 
The legality of resource extraction under Japanese law is inferred from the permissi-
bility of describing the purpose of a spacecraft in the launch license application as 
designed for resource extraction. See E-mail from Souichirou Kozuka, Professor of 
Law, Gakushuin Univ., to Mark J. Sundahl (Jan. 20, 2020) (on file with author). 
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existing law, although not ideal in every way, provides sufficient legal protec-
tions and regulatory certainty to allow both governments and industry to move 
forward with confidence. 
To dispel a common misperception, platinum mines are not in the plans 
for NASA and (most) other celestial pioneers.5 It’s true that there are virtually 
unlimited amounts of platinum and other valuable metals in space. However, 
the resource that will be most important as mankind establishes its first out-
posts on the Moon and Mars will be ice and other forms of water. Ice will 
provide water to drink, oxygen to breathe, and hydrogen as fuel. Once these 
needs are met, attention will turn to harvesting regolith for use as building 
material. 
The amount of readily available ice on the Moon and Mars is limited. The 
south pole of the Moon holds the great majority of relatively easily accessible 
ice and the race to reach the south pole is already on. In 2008, India’s Chan-
drayaan-1 mission discovered the widespread presence of ice in the regolith 
of the south pole. In 2019, China’s Chang’e 4 spacecraft was the first to 
achieve a soft landing near the south pole. It carried a rover named Yutu (or 
“Jade Rabbit”) to explore the area near the landing site for traces of ice, among 
other objectives. 
The fact that ice is a limited natural resource is one of the prime drivers of 
the need for a legal structure to ensure that a predictable legal regime is in 
place so that extraction can take place in an orderly, efficient, and fair manner 
without (military) conflict. Even more important at the moment is the need for 
regulatory certainty so that investors in those companies that plan to locate, 
retrieve, and process the ice (and then sell or itself use the ice-based products) 
will feel sufficiently secure to continue funding these ventures. Entrepreneurs 
need for assurance that they will have exclusive rights (which could be some-
thing less than property rights) over a certain surface area of a celestial body 
before they will expend large amounts of capital sending equipment and per-
sonnel to the area to begin mining. 
There have been two noteworthy attempts at the international level to cre-
ate norms to regulate the harvesting of ice and other natural resources. The 
1979 Moon Agreement was drafted with the intention to provide a set of rules 
that would govern resource extraction.6 In particular, Article 11 called for the 
creation of an international body that would undertake the drafting of these 
rules. This meant that when a country ratified or acceded to the treaty, that 
country bound itself to obey those rules—whenever they were adopted and 
 
 5 NASA, NASA’S PLAN FOR SUSTAINED LUNAR EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 6 
(2020), www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/a_sustained_lunar_presence_nspc_re 
port4220final.pdf (explaining that resource extraction experiments will explore the extrac-
tion of oxygen and water). 
 6 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bod-
ies, Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3.   
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whatever their substance.7 This provision, among others, was immediately re-
pugnant to the United States and the USSR. In fact, no major space actor has 
signed the treaty (which to date has only eighteen ratifications).8 It is widely 
considered a failed treaty. Although there is talk currently in the halls of the 
UN of a new push among the proponents of the Moon Treaty for its expanded 
ratification as resource extraction activities are becoming a near-term reality, 
this effort is not expected to go anywhere since the attitude of major space 
actors toward the treaty has not changed. 
Almost forty years later, in 2016, the University of Leiden and its consor-
tium partners launched the Hague International Space Resources Governance 
Working Group with the goal of creating “Building Blocks” that could, in 
turn, be used as a guide for creating a new set of norms (of whatever nature, 
including a treaty law, domestic laws, or some form of soft law, such as a set 
of guidelines or best practices) regarding the extraction and use of natural re-
sources.9 The members of the Working Group were drawn from academia, 
industry, government, and NGOs who met twice a year for four years to de-
bate the legal and policy issues that face the international community as re-
source extraction is commenced. 
The resulting body of twenty Building Blocks recommended a registry-
based system for registering so-called “priority rights.” Registrants would 
have a priority right to work the registered mine. A resource right registration 
would describe the location of the activity and a description of the activity to 
be conducted. “Safety zones” would be established to provide a buffer zone 
between the registered activity and any new activities undertaken by another 
operator.10 How exactly these safety zones would be measured is left open by 
the Building Blocks due to the wide variety of activities that could be regis-
tered. The safety zone for an operation on a low-gravity celestial body using 
explosives would require a large buffer area. In contrast, an operation that 
merely scraped ice off the surface of the Moon may not need much of a safety 
zone at all. Other Building Blocks address diverse issues, such as the creation 
of a database of best practices and measures for preventing harmful impacts 
to the environment or the activities of other actors. The Building Blocks also 
 
 7 Id. at art. 11. 
 8 Status of Treaties: Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/page 
s/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIV-2&chapter=24&clang=_en (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2020).  
 9 See Overview: The Hague International Working Group on the Governance of Space 
Resource Activity, UNIVERSTEIT LEIDEN, www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/law/institute-of-pub 
lic-law/institute-of-air-space-law/the-hague-space-resources-governance-working-group 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2020). The Working Group was financed by contributions from the 
Dutch Ministries of Foreign and Economic Affairs, the Secure World Foundation, and 
Deep Space Industries. 
 10 So-called “buffer zones,” typically in the range of 500 meters, are routinely provided 
for energy companies drilling for oil and gas from offshore platforms here on Earth. 
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contain provisions to protect cultural/historical sites (such as the Apollo land-
ing sites) as well as site of particular scientific interest. 
The Building Blocks have now been transmitted to the UN Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in Vienna (COPUOS). A “general exchange 
of views on potential legal models for activities in exploration, exploitation 
and utilization of space resources” was placed on the agenda of the 2020 meet-
ing of the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee.11 The Building Blocks will un-
doubtedly be an influential document as this discussion takes shape at the UN 
(which will be aided by the high-profile attendance of key Hague Working 
Group members at the subcommittee meetings). 
Now the question presents itself: Are we likely to see the emergence of a 
new treaty that will establish a comprehensive regime to govern resource ex-
traction? The simple answer is no. In fact, any attempt to create a new treaty 
will almost certainly meet the same fate as the Moon Agreement. If the planets 
align and the old opposition among major players to treaty law somehow dis-
sipate, the process of treaty-making in this day and age would be so protracted 
as to be virtually irrelevant to the need for immediate investment in resource 
extraction. Gone are the days of the 1960s and 1970s when four highly suc-
cessful space treaties were concluded in less than a decade. The number of 
countries directly involved in space activity has expanded exponentially since 
the days when only the United States and the USSR had the ability to travel 
beyond the Earth’s atmosphere. The COPUOS has become a complicated and 
politically tumultuous body that makes consensus (the standard used by the 
committee to take action) very difficult to achieve. As an example of how 
arduous treaty-making can be, one need only look at the Space Assets Protocol 
to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (a treaty 
that creates an international regime governing security interests in, as well as 
the leasing and sale of, satellites and other space assets).12 The project was 
conceived in 1984 and the Space Assets Protocol was concluded in 2012— 
twenty-eight years later. As of this writing, the treaty has only been signed by 
four states and ratified by none (ten ratifications are required for the protocol 
to enter into force).13 
So, where does this leave us? Is the world to move forward with settling 
the solar system without any binding law governing resource extraction activ-
ity? Will humanity be able to build a Moon village without a system of 
 
 11 See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Annotated Provisional Agenda of 
the 2020 Meeting of the UNCOPUOS Legal Subcomm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.312 
(2020). 
 12 For a general discussion of the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equip-
ment, see MARK J. SUNDAHL, THE CAPE TOWN CONVENTION: ITS OPERATION AND RELATION 
TO THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE (2010). 
 13 Status: Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on 
Matters Specific to Space Assets (Berlin, 2012), UNIDROIT, www.unidroit.org/status-201 
2-space (last visited Apr. 17, 2020).  
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recognizing the right to occupy a particular territory and extract resources 
from the surface and sub-surface of the Moon without interference from other 
actors? That scenario is scary. The possibility of conflicts between actors goes 
through the roof if there is not (1) a transparent system of registering land 
claims and (2) a binding legal regime that enables easy enforcement of these 
land claims. The next question is how to get there? If not by treaty, then how? 
Maybe a UN model law based on the Hague Building Blocks? This model law 
could facilitate the development of a “patchwork” of domestic laws which (1) 
provide for a national (or international) registry of claims, (2) provide for the 
easy enforcement of these claims, and (3) recognize the registered claims of 
nationals of other states. 
A patchwork of domestic laws is one alternative to a multilateral treaty. 
But how good of an alternative is it? Given the fact that the U.S., Luxembourg, 
and Japan have already adopted laws regarding space resource extraction, the 
formation of bilateral or trilateral treaties among these states is easily foresee-
able. Would the European Union consider joining the group? Australia? 
China? Russia? Brazil? India? All of these states and more, we hope. 
So how good of an alternative to treaty law is this patchwork approach? It 
has the potential to provide a level of legal certainty comparable to a treaty 
and has the distinct advantage of being politically feasible in the short term. 
Even if the international community headed down the road of seeking hard 
law, how long will it take to forge a multilateral among these nine parties? 
Five years? Ten years? Never? 
Let us wrap up this Article by taking up that last possibility. What if the 
international community is never able to conclude a broadly ratified treaty 
governing space resource extraction? Would we be doomed? Or could it be 
that we have sufficient laws in place already? In other words: Does existing 
space law suffice to govern the coming mining industry on the Moon and other 
celestial bodies? 
The answer is yes—in a minimalist sense. In this thought experiment, the 
following laws suffice to enable the mining industry: 
• the duty to operate in space “with due regard to the corresponding 
interests” of other states (Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty14) 
• the duty to consult with affected states if there is a possibility of 
harmful interference with another state’s activity (Article IX of 
the Outer Space Treaty15) 
• the liability that attaches when a state or national causes damage 
(The Liability Convention16) 
 
 14  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, at art. IX.  
     15  Id. 
     16  Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force Sept. 1, 1992). 
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• general international law regarding (1) state liability and (2) pro-
hibitions on the use of force (Corfu Channel/Nicaragua17) 
Due regard is one of the touchstones of the Outer Space Treaty. It requires 
that the “corresponding interests” of other states be considered, at a minimum, 
when conducting space activities.18 But the duty could impose broader obli-
gations beyond merely giving thought to the interests of other countries prior 
to acting.19 Julia Gaunce concludes, in her analysis of the use of “due regard” 
in the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), that the duty 
requires “at least some consultation” with affected states.20 However, consul-
tation “need not continue indefinitely or until the other party is happy.”21 
Gaunce provides an example of what the arbitral tribunal in the Chagos arbi-
tration considered a failure of the United Kingdom to fulfill this duty to act 
with “due regard”: 
The Tribunal found that the Applicant Mauritius holds rights 
in the area of the [marine preserve] that arose from undertak-
ings by the U.K. (reversionary rights to the Chagos Archipel-
ago, and to fishing and preservation of mineral resources in its 
territorial sea and EEZ). The Tribunal ruled that the U.K. had 
“failed properly to balance its own rights and interests with 
Mauritius’ rights” in deciding to create the [marine reserve].22 
Perhaps most interestingly, Gaunce goes on to explain that the duty to op-
erate with “due regard” in the context of the UNCLOS requires not only a 
duty to take into account the interests of those states immediately affected, but 
also the broader interests of the international community, including ecological 
concerns and the effects of climate change: 
The interpretation of due regard offered [in this paper] con-
cludes, among other things, that the duty of due regard 
 
   17  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judg-
ment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Preliminary Objection, 
1948 I.C.J. 15 (Mar. 28). 
   18  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, at art. IX. 
 19 Our thanks to Jennifer Warren of Lockheed Martin who brought the use of the phrase 
“due regard” in the UNCLOS to the attention of the authors. One should keep in mind, as 
Julia Gaunce points out, that “the application of international law rules on interpretation of 
treaties to identical or similar provisions of different treaties may not yield the same results, 
having regard to, inter alia, differences in the respective contexts, objects and purposes, 
subsequent practice of parties and travaux préparatoires.” Julia Gaunce, On the Interpreta-
tion of the General Duty of ‘Due Regard’, 32 OCEAN Y.B. ONLINE 27, 43 (2018) (citing 
MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), Provisional Measures, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2001), para. 51). 
 20 Gaunce, supra note 19, at 51 (internal citations omitted). 
 21 Id. 
   22  Id. 
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encompasses not only a mutual duty bilaterally between com-
peting states to balance their activities but also a duty to the 
interests of the international community. In a post-laissez-faire 
legal order of the seas, international community interests must 
now also be identified with ecology, including climate change 
mitigation.23   
Article 3 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation re-
quires states to exercise “due regard for the safety of navigation of civil air-
craft” when drafting their regulations regarding the operation of state air-
craft.24 A working paper presented by the Federal Aviation Administration in 
Paris in 2015 explains that the duty to operate with “due regard” to civil avi-
ation requires that the pilot of a state aircraft operate as follows: 
1. Separate his/her aircraft from all other air traffic; and 
2. Assure that an appropriate monitoring agency assumes re-
sponsibility for search and rescue actions; and 
3. Operate under at least one of the following conditions: 
 
(a) In visual meteorological conditions (VMC); or 
 
(b) Within radar surveillance and radio communications of a 
surface radar facility; or (c) Be equipped with airborne radar 
that is sufficient to provide separation between his/her aircraft 
and any other aircraft he/she may be controlling and other air-
craft; or 
 
(d) Operate within Class G airspace.25 
 
(e) An understanding between the pilot and controller regard-
ing the intent of the pilot and the status of the flight should be 
 
 23 Id. at 59.  
 24 Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 3, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [Chi-
cago Convention]. 
 25 Class G airspace is uncontrolled airspace (which typically involves flight at very low 
altitudes). AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL: OFFICIAL GUIDE TO BASIC FLIGHT 
INFORMATION AND ATC PROCEDURES 3-3-1 (2017). 
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arrived at before the aircraft leaves ATC [air traffic control] 
frequency.26 
Each of these conditions share the common goal of reducing the risk to 
civil aircraft and the risk of injury or death to civilian passengers. For our 
purposes, the more important lesson here is that these conditions all describe 
positive actions that must be taken by pilots in order to comply with the obli-
gation. It is not sufficient for pilots to merely take into consideration the risk 
to civil aviation. Concrete action to reduce such risk must also be taken.27 
In light of the foregoing, the requirement that states conduct space activi-
ties with due regard to the corresponding interests of other states has the po-
tential to be interpreted more broadly than is typically understood and could 
be seen as requiring not only consideration of other states’ interests, but also 
the interests of the international community (including ecological/environ-
mental interests). Moreover, beyond mere consideration of others’ interests, 
operating with due regard appears to require consultations with affected states 
and, perhaps, the taking of concrete actions to protect the interests of other 
states. In other words, this existing duty may be more effective than previously 
believed in addressing the concerns that surround resource extraction. 
The duty to consult with affected states may be derived from the obligation 
of “due regard,” but even if that were not so, Article IX of the Outer Space 
Treaty makes explicit that consultation with affected states is required if there 
is a possibility of “harmful interference” with such state’s activities: 
If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an ac-
tivity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space 
. . . would cause potentially harmful interference with activi-
ties of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use 
of outer space . . . it shall undertake appropriate international 
consultations before proceeding with any such activity or ex-
periment.28 
In addition to placing a duty to consult on the acting party, Article IX also 
gives the affected state the right to request consultations if activity planned by 
 
 26 Id. at 1 (with some redactions). 
 27 For purposes of comparison, U.S. law requires a flight safety analysis prior to the 
launch of a space vehicle. 14 C.F.R. §417.231(b). In the case of an orbital launch, for ex-
ample, “the analysis must establish any launch waits needed to ensure that the launch ve-
hicle, any jettisoned components, and its payload do not pass closer than 200 kilometers to 
a manned or mannable orbiting object during ascent to initial orbital insertion through at 
least one complete orbit.” Id. at §417.231(b). It is worth noting that only collisions with 
“manned or mannable orbiting object.” 
   28 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, at art. IX.  
692 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 48:683 
another state “would cause potentially harmful interference” to its activities.29 
What exactly constitutes “harmful interference” in the context of Article IX is 
subject to debate. Frans von der Dunk has argued that “[w]hile there is a ge-
neric legal interest emanating from the Outer Space Treaty to avoid harmful 
interference . . . , the Treaty as such remains too unspecific and abstract to 
serve as a helpful legal instrument to combat harmful interference.”30 This is 
a rather cynical view on what constitutes “harmful interference.” But where 
else can we look for guidance? Perhaps the best analogy is found in the ITU’s 
Radio Regulation 1.169, which defines “harmful interference” thus: 
interference which endangers the functioning of a radionavi-
gation service or of other safety services or seriously degrades, 
obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunication ser-
vice operating in accordance with Radio Regulations.31 
Would activity that endangers the functioning of a mining operation con-
stitute “harmful interference” under the Outer Space Treaty? What about ac-
tivity that seriously degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts the operation 
of a mine? I would argue that all such activities would constitute “harmful 
interference” under the treaty. At the end of the day, the uncertainty at the 
edges doesn’t necessarily cause a problem. The definition of “harmful inter-
ference” is much like the definition of the edge of space—there is no pressing 
need to find a precise answer. 
With this we have reached the end of our analysis of existing law. More 
can be said about the Liability Convention, the international law on the use of 
force, and domestic actions under tort law, but that is for another article. 
We now bring the threads of this article together by positing the following: 
The duty of due regard in concert with the duty to consult un-
der Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty are together sufficient 
to: 
(1) deter harmful interference among different actors; 
(2) promote safe practices among all actors; and 
 
    29  Id.  
 30 Frans G. von der Dunk,“Space Side” to “Harmful Interference”—Evaluating Regu-
latory Instruments in Addressing Interference Issues in the Context of Satellite Communi-
cations, in HARMFUL INTERFERENCE IN REGULATORY PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL RULES FOR 
INTERFERENCE-FREE RADIO COMMUNICATION: 3RD LUXEMBOURG WORKSHOP ON SPACE 
AND SATELLITE COMMUNICATION LAW 87, 91 (Mahulena Hofmann ed., 2015). 
    31  47 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1984).  
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(3) protect historical sites and sites of special scientific inter-
est.32 
This answers the question that was posed above: What if the political re-
alities of the day prevent the creation of any new hard law? The answer is that 
the mining industry can move forward with confidence that the international 
order has already provided a sufficiently predictable and certain regulatory 
regime. Once a mining operation is initiated on the Moon, all subsequent ac-
tors must act with due regard for its interests (or more accurately, the interests 
of the operator’s country). Moreover, if a subsequent actor is planning a 
nearby mining operation, that actor must actively engage any affected country 
by initiating consultations in the event that the planned operation could harm-
fully interfere with the existing operations. 
Now the final plea. The international community should create a new in-
ternational registry as follows:33 
• The UN would an create a registry of resource claims that is avail-
able online for free to the public 24/7.   
• Each filing would contain the following information:   
o Name of authorizing state 
o Name and nationality of operator 
o Location of the activity 
o Nature of the activity 
o Duration of the activity 
• The registry would be indexed and searchable by location (by lat-
itude/longitude or other appropriate cartographical parameters). 
• A search would produce any filings made in proximity to the lo-
cation searched (the closest existing operation being listed first). 
• Sites of cultural heritage and scientific interest could be filed in 
order to protect such sites. 
The operation of the registry would be similar to the coordination process 
used in conjunction with the ITU Master Register. When the registry opens, 
those states and companies that are already operating on the Moon (or other 
celestial bodies) would register their activity. The Apollo landing sites will be 
among the first sites of cultural heritage to be registered. The first sites of 
natural heritage and scientific interest will also be registered. 
New operators will eventually move in. These new operators will search 
the registry by inputting the location of the potential site. The result of the 
 
 32 “Corresponding interests” could be interpreted broadly to discourage harm historical 
sites and sites of special scientific interest. 
 33 This registry format was first proposed by Prof. Sundahl in Mark J. Sundahl, An In-
ternational Registry and Registrar for Priority Rights to Extract Resources on Celestial 
Bodies, in 2019 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW (forthcom-
ing in 2020). 
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search would be a map of the location and the surrounding area. The user 
could zoom in or out of the map. On the map, the user will see any sites that 
have already been registered. If there is an existing operator in the vicinity of 
the potential location, the new operator would have to make a decision. Can 
the new company operate without harmfully interfering with the existing op-
erator? 
And here is the how the registry is the glue that holds this sparse regime 
together—and why its creation is our final plea. By registering your resource 
claim you are putting the world on notice of the sphere of your planned activ-
ity. If a later actor undertakes any resource extraction activity in the vicinity 
of a registered claim, such actor will not be able to claim ignorance. That actor 
must act with due regard to the interests of the registered party—and if there 
is a chance of harmful interference, consultations must be undertaken.34 A 
treaty will be needed to create this registry. The question is whether there is 
sufficient political will to support even this modest proposal. Even a voluntary 
registry, perhaps administered by a nonprofit organization, could make public 
the necessary information about planned and existing missions to allow other 
actors to fulfill most effectively their duty to operate with due regard. The 
broad adoption of the voluntary registry would be the most critical aspect of 
its success. As its use becomes customary, the registry will eventually serve 
as the de facto mechanism for avoiding conflicts between space resource op-
erations.35 
The next step? We will see how these issues play out during the general 
exchange of views on space resource activity at next meeting of the COPUOS 
Legal Subcommittee in Vienna. In the meantime, preparations for establishing 
a permanent human presence on the Moon move forward aggressively. If the 
UN takes no concrete action on the issue, we will all have an opportunity to 
observe in real time whether or not existing law is sufficient to handle any 
potential conflicts that arise. 
 
 
 
 34 The notice provided by registration could also be important in an action under the 
Liability Convention. Again, ignorance would be impossible to claim. 
 35 At a bare minimum, the international community would have to rely on the existing 
UN registry that requires the sharing of information about space objects “launched into 
Earth orbit and beyond.” Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 
art. III, Jan. 14, 1975, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15. This registry does not typically contain much 
detail regarding either the location or purpose of space objects, so it would be of question-
able utility (particularly when lunar activity evolves to include many actors and activities 
at which point specific information about neighboring activities will be critical to avoid 
interference). The utility of the existing registry could be enhanced by an agreement (or 
understanding) among states to provide more detailed information. 
